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Abstract
The present study evaluated the status of mood congruent memory bias in implicit memory tasks
for threat related information. A literature review complemented by three experiments on high and
low trait anxiety participants found no implicit memory bias for threat-related information in
anxious individuals on either word fragment completion or tachistoscopic word identification
tasks. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.
Laboratory-based studies have provided evidence of a processing bias towards threat-related
information in clinical anxiety and in people high in trait anxiety (for reviews see Logan &
Goetsch, 1993; Wells & Matthews, 1994; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997).
For example, in the modified Stroop task clinically anxious patients and high trait anxious
individuals show increased interference in naming the color in which threat-related words
are presented, compared to non-anxious controls (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996).
Similarly, in the dot probe task it has been shown that anxious individuals are faster at
detecting a visual probe when this is displayed in the same location as a threat-related item
relative to a neutral item (e.g. Fox, 1993; Mogg, Bradley, & Hallowell, 1994). Comparable
biases occur in tasks requiring the interpretation of ambiguous information. Anxious
individuals interpret ambiguous information in a threatening way to a larger extent than do
non-anxious individuals (e.g. Mathews, Richards, & Eysenck, 1989; Richards & French,
1992; MacLeod & Cohen, 1993; Calvo, Eysenck, & Castillo, 1997). 1
Various information processing models on the relationships between cognition and emotion
have been proposed to accommodate the above findings (e.g. Bower, 1981; Wells &
Matthews, 1994; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988; 1997). While several
models make predictions on the status of memory bias in explicit tasks like free recall and
recognition, Williams et al's information processing model is the only model which predicts
that high trait anxious individuals should show a mood congruent memory bias in implicit
memory tasks. More specifically, the implicit tasks relevant to Williams et al's model are
generally called perceptual implicit memory tasks. This is because they are mainly sensitive
to manipulations of perceptual features of target items. The aim of the present study is to
assess the status of the memory bias in perceptual implicit tasks (the term perceptual will be
omitted in the remaining part of the article) for threat-related information in anxious
individuals. To this end some common implicit memory tasks are described. Then, a brief
description of Williams et al.'s model is given which highlights the mechanism that they
suggest should induce an implicit memory bias for threat-related information in anxious
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1As a cautionary note, it is relevant to point out that while anxious individuals show a robust bias toward threat-related information it
is not always clear if this bias applies exclusively to this type of information or if it also extends to emotional stimuli in general. Some
empirical findings using the modified Stroop task (e.g. Mogg & Marden, 1990; Martin, Williams, & Clark, 1991, but see Mathews &
Klug, 1993), the probe detection task (Gayle Beck, Stanley, Averill, Baldwin, & Deagle III, 1992; but see Mogg et al., 1994), and the
homophone spelling task (Russo et al., 1996, but see Byrne & Eysenck, 1993) suggests that information processing bias in anxious
individuals may occur for both positive and threat-related emotional information.
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individuals. Finally, the relevant experimental literature on implicit memory in anxious
people is reviewed and new empirical data are presented.
Implicit memory tasks assess the influence of a past experience on the performance of a
cognitive task seemingly unrelated to the previous experience. For example, in a word stem
completion task participants are asked to complete word stems (e.g. tra.....) with the first
word that pops into their mind. In general, stems corresponding to target words experienced
at learning are more likely to be completed with the correct target compared to stems
corresponding to target words not experienced at learning. The positive influence of past
experiences on performance in implicit memory tasks is usually called a priming effect. An
important feature of these tasks is that the advantage shown for the primed targets occurs
even when participants do not consciously recollect having experienced these targets during
learning. Empirical studies have provided evidence of dissociations between explicit and
implicit memory tasks (for a review see Roediger & McDermott, 1993). Theoretical
interpretations of the empirical data has lead to the hypothesis that either different memory
systems or different memory processes support implicit and explicit memory (for accounts
about these different theoretical positions see Roediger & McDermott, 1993; Schacter,
1994).
The Williams et al. (1988, 1997) model predicts that high trait anxious individuals should
show an implicit memory bias for threat-related information. Williams et al argue that an
affective decision mechanism operates at a pre-attentive level and determines the threat
value of incoming stimuli. This affective decision mechanism can be influenced by elevated
state anxiety which favours an increment of the affective salience of threat stimuli. Stimuli
are then directed to a resource allocation mechanism where threat-related stimuli receive
preferential allocation of resources in individuals with high trait anxiety. This increased
allocation of pre-attentive resources towards an item is considered by Williams et al. to be
functionally equivalent to multiple exposures to the same item. Following Mandler's (1980)
dual process theoretical framework, a framework which partly inspired Williams et al.'s
model, increased allocation of pre-attentive resources towards threat-related stimuli during
study should facilitate their integration. Integrative processes are said to operate on the
perceptual/structural characteristics of an event by reactivating the relationships among the
perceptual features of the event. One of the consequences of integration is that if an event
has to be matched to some stored internal representation, its previous integration should
favour this matching.
Consider now the study phase of an implicit memory task. People are usually presented with
a series of items to be incidentally learned for a later test. According to the above
mechanism, only threat-related information should receive preferential allocation of
resources at a pre-attentive level in high trait anxious people. This mechanism, which
operates only in high anxious individuals, induces better perceptual integration of threat-
related compared to neutral studied information. The consequence of this extra integration of
threat-related studied (or more generally primed) information is that this information “will
be more likely to be produced (or heard, or seen) when only some of its components are
presented” (Williams et al. 1997, p.281). Given that implicit memory tasks are based on the
production or identification of incomplete or difficult to perceive versions of primed and
unprimed targets, it follows, according to Williams et al., that only high anxious people
should show an advantage in the production or identification of primed threat-related
information over primed neutral information (i.e. they should show an implicit memory bias
for threat-related information).
Consistent with the above prediction, Williams et al's (1997) review of implicit memory bias
in anxiety suggests that the majority of the published studies have found evidence for a bias
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toward negative material. However, it is important to note that no clear criteria for memory
bias were specified by the authors. Therefore, in order to have an unequivocal assessment of
implicit memory bias in anxiety it is important to re-evaluate the available empirical data
using clearly specified criteria.
We argue that evidence indicative of implicit memory bias for threat-related information in
anxiety should comply with the following criteria (see also Eysenck & Byrne, 1995 for
similar criteria):
a) There should be a significant interaction between anxiety status and word type
on the magnitude of the priming effect;
b) The pattern of the interaction should be such that high anxious individuals show
larger priming effects for threat-related words compared to low anxious
individuals. This should be coupled with low anxious people showing better or
equal priming effects than high anxious individuals for neutral words; or
alternatively, high anxious people may show a larger priming effect for neutral
words compared to low anxious people, provided that this difference is smaller
than the one detected for threat-related information.
c) High anxious individuals should show significantly larger priming effects for
threat-related information compared to neutral information.
This last criterion follows from the assumption that threat-related information presented at
learning is more perceptually integrated than learned neutral information in high anxious
individuals (Williams et al., 1997). However, we acknowledge that criterion c may be valid
only in theory but not in practice. For instance, this criterion could be questioned on the
grounds that there may be differences in the intrinsic primability between neutral and threat-
related target words despite the fact that target items are usually matched for lexical
variables like word length or word frequency which may affect implicit memory tasks (for a
review see Roediger & McDermott, 1993).
Memory bias for threat-related information in high trait anxiety has been investigated in five
previous studies using implicit memory tasks (i.e. Richards & French, 1991; Bradley, Mogg
& Williams, 1994; Eysenck & Byrne, 1994; Nugent & Mineka, 1994; Lang & Craske,
1997). Four studies assessed the presence of bias for threat-related information in implicit
memory tasks among generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) patients (Mathews, Mogg, May,
& Eysenck, 1989; Otto, McNally, Pollack, Chen, & Rosenbaum, 1994; Mathews, Mogg,
Kentish, & Eysenck, 1995; MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995).
Table 1 presents a summary of the relevant clinical and nonclinical studies. As shown,
criterion a was only passed by three studies (Mathews et al., 1989; Eysenck & Byrne, 1994;
MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995). In these studies there was a significant anxiety by word
type interaction on priming in implicit tasks. The same studies also passed criterion b in the
form of the significant interaction. However, only the Eysenck and Byrne (1995) study
passed criterion c. In their study, anxious individuals showed a significantly larger priming
effect for threat-related words compared to neutral stimuli in a word stem completion task.
Finally, the outcome of some experiments was difficult to evaluate due to some problems in
the experimental design employed. For example, Nugent and Mineka's (1994) Experiment 2
it is difficult to interpret since they did not use a within-subjects measure of baseline. A
similar problem applies to Lang and Craske's (1997) study where baseline measures are not
reported. In summary, on the basis of this literature review it seems that there is actually
very little evidence to support the presence of an implicit memory bias among either high
trait anxiety individuals or clinically anxious individuals. To further test for the presence of
implicit memory bias for threat-related information in anxiety we tested high and low trait
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anxiety individuals in two types of implicit memory task: word fragment completion and
word identification.
Experiment 1 employed a word fragment completion task in which participants read target
words during study and then completed word fragments at test. Experiments 2a and 2b
employed the identification of tachistoscopically presented words as implicit memory tasks.
In all experiments, an attempt was made to increase the participants level of state anxiety.
According to the Williams et al. model, elevated state anxiety favours better integration of
threat-related information by orienting processing resources toward threat, it should
therefore be easier to detect the presence of an implicit memory bias for threat-related words
among high trait anxious people when state-anxiety is elevated. However, to anticipate the
obtained results, we did not find any evidence that trait anxiety increases the magnitude of
implicit memory biases for threatening information in any experiment.
Experiment 1
A study reported by Richards and French (1991) using a word fragment completion task has
frequently been cited as evidence for the presence of an implicit memory bias for threat-
related information in high trait anxiety (e.g. Williams et al, 1997). However, a close look at
their data shows that the priming advantage for threat-related material in anxious individuals
occurred only after a self-referenced imagery condition, and was not significantly larger than
the advantage shown by low trait anxious individuals (see Table 1). Given the relevance that
was given to the far from clear cut results obtained in the Richards and French (1991) study
we considered that a replication was important . Therefore, we used a very similar procedure
except that we used only the read-only condition at study.
Method
Participants—A total of fifty-two graduate and undergraduate students aged between 18
and 50 took part in the experiment. Twenty-eight people who obtained a score of 42 or
above on the Trait form of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch,
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) were allocated to a high trait anxiety group (M = 52.6, SD
= 7.3, range 42-71), while twenty-four people scoring below 38 were allocated to the low
trait anxiety group (M = 33.5, SD = 3.3, range 25-37). Participant ratings on the state and
trait forms of the anxiety inventory were collected at least four weeks before they took part
in the study.
Design and material—We employed a mixed design. Word type (threatening vs. neutral)
and priming (primed words vs. unprimed words) were within-subjects factors. Trait anxiety
(high vs. low) was a between-subjects factor.
Two different lists of words (A and B) were used in this experiment. Each list comprised 24
threat-related and 24 neutral words. These words, and their corresponding word fragments,
were the same as those originally used by Richards and French (1991). Half of the
participants in each group studied list A, while word fragments from list B were employed at
test to measure baseline word fragment completion performance. The remaining participants
studied list B, while word fragments from list A served at test to measure baseline
performance. Threat-related and neutral words were randomly arranged within each study
list. Only two different random orders were employed, one for each study list. The word
fragment completion test list comprised the word fragments from both sets presented in the
same random order for all participants. A preliminary analysis including word list as a
factor, indicated that there was neither a significant main effect of word list on word
completion, nor that the list factor interacted significantly with any other experimental
variable.
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Procedure—Participants were told they would be asked to perform a series of tasks
intended to collect normative data. Before study, participants were asked to rate the
emotional impact of a series of pictures of unpleasant newspaper photographs. This was
done in an attempt to increase the participants' level of state anxiety. Each participant was
then presented with words from list A or list B. Words were presented one at the time for 2.5
s each with a 0.5 s blank interval between each word. During this time, participants were
required to read aloud each word. No mention was made to the participants that they were
taking part in a memory test. In fact, they were told that the task was intended to collect
normative data on how people pronounce words. During the five minute delay between the
study and the test phase participants were asked to perform a filler task (i.e. a digit
cancellation task). During the test phase, participants were presented with all of the 96 word
fragments and were asked to complete each word fragment, if possible, with the first English
word they could think of. Fragments were shown one by one and participants were given
13.5 s to try to complete each fragment. The allowed completion time per fragment is
comparable to that employed in similar experiments (e.g. in Challis & Brodbeck, 1992, 10 s
per fragment were allowed; in Craik, Moscovitch & McDowd, 1994, 15 s per fragment were
allowed). Finally each participant was given the state form of the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory questionnaire to complete.
Results and Discussion
The presentation of the unpleasant newspaper photographs was not successful in increasing
the level of state anxiety from the baseline level measured at least four weeks before the
memory task was administered. State anxiety scores increased from an average of 32.1 to
32.4 in low trait anxiety individuals, and from 43 to 45.5 in high trait anxiety individuals. A
2 (high vs. low trait anxiety) by 2 (before and after picture presentation) mixed ANOVA on
these data showed only a main effect of groups, F (1,52) = 27.54, MSE = 129.5, p < .01,
indicating that high trait anxiety individuals displayed higher level of state anxiety compared
to low trait anxiety participants. However, state anxiety was not significantly elevated
following presentation of the threatening photographs, and the interaction was also not
significant, Fs < 1.29.
Table 2 presents the mean number of fragments completed, as well as the priming scores
(i.e. the difference between primed and non-primed words) for each experimental condition.
A 2 (word type; threatening vs. neutral) by 2 (trait anxiety; high vs. low) mixed ANOVA on
the number of unprimed completed word fragments did not show any significant main effect
or interaction, Fs < 1, indicating that baseline performance was comparable across word
types and anxiety groups.
A 2 (word type; threatening vs. neutral) by 2 (priming; primed words vs. unprimed words)
by 2 (trait anxiety; high vs. low) mixed ANOVA on the number of completed words showed
only a significant main effect of priming, F(1, 50) = 210.72, MSE = 6.64, p < .01, indicating
that primed targets were identified more often than non-primed baseline words. No other
main effects or interactions were significant, Fs < 2.25. For high anxious people the
difference between priming scores for threat-related items minus the priming score for
neutral words was 0.18 items (95% CI ranged from −1.46 to 1.81 items), while this
difference was 0.54 items for low trait anxiety participants (95% CI ranged from −1.53 to
2.62 items). Assuming a medium effect size in the population (i.e. d = 0.5; see Cohen,
1988), the statistical power that Experiment 1 had to detect a significant difference between
priming scores for threat-related items compared to neutral items in high trait anxiety
participants was .84 (one-tail). It therefore appears that the priming effect for threat-related
vs. neutral words was not affected by trait anxiety in this experiment .
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The results obtained in Experiment 1 failed to replicate Richards and French's (1991)
finding. No mood congruent memory bias was found in high trait anxious participants. High
anxious participants did not show a larger priming effect for threat-related stimuli compared
to neutral stimuli. Moreover, the interaction between word type and trait anxiety on priming
was nonsignificant. Therefore, none of the three criteria indicative of an implicit memory
bias for threat-related information in anxiety were passed.
This conclusion may be premature, however, because word fragment completion may not be
a pure measure of implicit memory (e.g. Perruchet & Baveaux, 1989; Russo & Andrade,
1995). In other words, despite the precautions that were taken to disguise the mnemonic
nature of the test by including it within a series of seemingly unrelated tasks, it is possible
that explicit memory strategies may have been used to complete the target fragments.
Therefore, we thought it important to assess implicit memory for threat words by using a
word identification task. MacLeod and McLaughlin (1995) have argued that tachistoscopic
word identification is an implicit task that is less likely to be contaminated by conscious
retrieval of target information (see Perruchet & Baveaux, 1989). Thus, this task may be
more appropriate to detect an implicit mood congruent memory bias in anxious individuals.
It is also possible that the failure to increase the level of state anxiety in the current study
might have resulted in the null result. Therefore, to further test the hypothesis about the
presence of an implicit memory bias for threat words in anxious individuals, we conducted
two more experiments using the identification of tachistoscopically presented under
conditions in which state anxiety was elevated.
Experiment 2a
Experiment 2a used tachistoscopic word identification to study implicit memory. In this
task, primed and unprimed words are presented for a very brief duration at test. Given the
difficulty of detecting the briefly presented words, primed words are more likely to be read
than unprimed words. MacLeod and McLaughlin (1995) found that there was a significant
anxiety by word type interaction with a sample of Generalised Anxiety Disorder patients
(GAD). However, it is unclear from their study if GAD patients showed a reliably larger
priming effect for threat-related compared to neutral words (criterion C). The present
experiment was designed to assess the presence or absence of an implicit memory bias for
threat-related information in non-clinical high trait anxious individuals using a word
identification task.
Method
Participants—Sixty-one undergraduate students aged between 19 and 24 took part in the
experiment. From this sample, those participants who obtained a score of 45 and above, i.e.
n = 27, were allocated to the high trait anxiety group (M = 49.01, SD = 2.76, range 45-54),
while those participants who obtained a score of 36 and below, i.e. n = 24, were allocated to
the low trait anxiety group (M = 29.4, SD = 5.7, range 20-36). The data from the remaining
participants were not included in the statistical analyses. In Experiment 2a we used a stricter
criterion for the inclusion of participants in the high trait anxiety group. This was done in
order to increase the power to detect an implicit memory bias among anxious individuals.2
Design and material—We employed a mixed design. Word type (threatening vs. neutral)
and priming (primed words vs. unprimed words) were within-subjects factors. High versus
2In Experiments 2a and 2b participants were included in the high anxiety groups if they scored 45 and above in the trait anxiety
questionnaire. We therefore reanalyzed the data of Experiment 1 including in the high anxious groups only those participants who
scored 45 and above in the anxiety questionnaire (i.e. n = 22). The results of this analysis did not differ from those obtained with the
full sample.
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low trait anxiety was the between-subjects factor. The target words were the same as those
used in Experiment 1. When participants studied word list A, words from list B were
employed at test to measure baseline word identification performance, and vice versa.
Among high trait anxiety participants, 16 people studied list A and 11 list B. Among low
trait anxiety participants, 13 people studied list A and 11 studies list B. Preliminary analyses
including the effect of list type indicated that there was no significant main effect of word
list on word identification, and that word list did not interact significantly with any of the
other experimental variables. Therefore, the imperfect counterbalancing cannot be held
responsible for the obtained results in the word identification test. The word identification
test list comprised the words from both sets in random order.
Procedure—Initially each participant completed the trait and state forms of the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory. Then all participants undertook the task used in the previous experiment
to increase state anxiety. Following this task participants were given the state form of the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for the second time.
After the mood induction procedure, the study phase of the word identification task began.
In this phase each word was presented for 5 s with an interstimulus interval of 0.5 s. In order
to induce incidental learning of target material, participants were required to imagine
themselves in relation to the presented word. No mention was made to the participants that
they were taking part in a memory test.
During the interval between the study and the test phase of the word identification test,
participants were given a calibration task in order to find an exposure speed at which word
identification was impaired. This task started by presenting single words on a computer
screen for 153 ms. If the individual could read the word at a given speed the exposure
duration was decreased by 17 ms steps. The exposure duration at which a participant made
two consecutive errors was the critical exposure duration for that person employed in the
test phase of the word identification test. This task lasted between 5 and 10 min. None of the
target experimental words was used in this task.
Finally, during the test phase of the word identification task, participants were shown all the
96 words one by one at the critical exposure duration previously determined. These words
were presented in a different random order for each participant. Everybody who participated
in the experiment had to try to read out each word as it was presented.
Results and Discussion
The presentation of unpleasant newspaper photographs was successful in increasing the
level of state anxiety. State anxiety scores increased from an average of 27.7 to 28.7 in low
trait anxiety participants, and from 45 to 49.7 in high anxiety participants. A 2 (high vs. low
trait anxiety) by 2 (before and after picture presentation) mixed ANOVA on these data
showed that state anxiety was significantly elevated, F(1, 48) = 14.76, MSE = 18.04, p < .01.
The significant interaction between the two factors, F(1, 48) = 4.63, MSE = 18.04, p < .05,
suggests that the increment in state anxiety was larger in the high trait anxiety group. The
state anxiety test scores of one participant were not included in the above analysis because
they are missing.
Table 3 reports the mean number of words identified, as well as the priming scores (i.e. the
difference between primed and non-primed words) for each experimental condition. A 2
(word type; threatening vs. neutral) by 2 (trait anxiety; high vs. low) mixed ANOVA on the
number of unprimed identified words did not show any significant main effect or
interaction, Fs < 1.13, indicating that baseline performance was comparable across word
types and anxiety groups.
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A 2 (word type; threatening vs. neutral) by 2 (priming; primed words vs. unprimed words)
by 2 (trait anxiety; high vs. low) mixed ANOVA on the number of identified words showed
a significant main effect of priming, F(1, 49) = 34.91, MSE = 6.51, p < .01, indicating that
primed targets were identified more often than non-primed baseline words. No other main
effects or interactions approached significance, Fs < 1.58. None of the differences between
priming scores for threat-related and neutral items were significant. For high anxious
participants the difference between the priming scores for threat-related items and the
priming scores for neutral words was −1.04 items (95% CI ranged from −2.42 to 0.35
items), while this difference was 0.13 items for low trait anxiety participants (95% CI
ranged from −1.17 to 1.42 items).
Experiment 2a did not show any indication of mood congruent memory bias for threat-
related information in high trait anxiety participants in a word identification task despite
elevated levels of state anxiety. If anything, the priming effect for threat-related stimuli
compared to neutral words was numerically lower in high trait anxiety people compared to
low anxious controls. In order to assess the robustness of the absence of a mood congruent
memory bias for threat-related information in high trait anxiety we conducted a further
experiment. Experiment 2b was intended to replicate Experiment 2a using a different set of
words (i.e. those originally used by MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995). To induce incidental
learning of target words, participants were asked to perform a read-only encoding task and a
self-referenced task. These conditions were used in order to increase the possibility of
detecting an implicit memory bias among anxious participants. For example, MacLeod and
McLaughlin (1995) using a reading encoding task, found a significant anxiety by word type
interaction using a word identification task, while Richards and French (1991) detected a
reliable implicit memory bias in a non-clinical sample of anxious individuals using a self-
reference encoding condition. In Experiment 2b state anxiety was elevated by naturally
occurring stressors (i.e. impending examination). Given that naturalistic stressors have been
shown to induce attentional bias more readily than laboratory-based stressors (e.g. Mogg et
al., 1994), it should, therefore, be easier to detect an implicit memory bias for threat-related
information in anxious individuals (if it exists) under a naturalistic stressful condition.
Experiment 2b
Method
Participants—Thirty-two undergraduate students took part in the experiment. These were
selected from a large sample of students who completed both state and trait forms of the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory at the beginning of the academic year. Participants scoring 45
and above in the trait anxiety inventory were allocated to the high anxious group (16
people). This group had a mean trait anxiety score of 54.6 (SD = 5.9, range 45-64.
Participants scoring 35 and below in the trait anxiety inventory were allocated to the low
anxious group (16 people). This group had a mean trait anxiety score of 28.3 (SD = 4.7,
range 22-35). Testing took place approximately two to three weeks prior to the end of year
exams. This time was chosen because we expected that students would have increased levels
of state anxiety close to the examination period relative to their baseline measured early in
the academic year.
Design and material—We employed a mixed design. Word type (threatening vs.
neutral), priming (primed words vs. unprimed words), and encoding conditions (self-
referenced vs. read-only) were within-subjects factors. High versus low trait anxiety was the
between-subjects factor. The target words were the same as those used by MacLeod and
McLaughlin (1995). There were 192 words in total (96 threat-related and 96 neutral).
Twenty-four threat-related and twenty-four neutral words were randomly selected to create
four different sets of words (A1, A2, B1 and B2). Sets A1 and A2 were used in the self-
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referenced encoding condition, while sets B1 and B2 were used in the read-only condition. It
is therefore relevant to point out that the lack of counterbalancing between word sets and
study conditions (i.e. reading vs. self-reference) makes it difficult to evaluate any effect of
the encoding conditions on priming. When participants studied word sets 1, words from sets
2 were employed at test to measure baseline word identification performance, and vice
versa. Each study list therefore consisted of 48 threat-related and 48 neutral words. The
counterbalancing of word sets and order of encoding conditions insured that four
participants in each anxiety group were presented with one of these study lists (i.e. A1B1,
B1A1, A2B2, B2A2). The word identification test list comprised all the 192 words which
were presented in a different random order for each participant.
Procedure—Initially all participants were given the state form of the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory. During the study phase of the word identification task each word was presented
for 1 s. The appearance of the next word in the list was under the control of the participants.
In order to induce incidental learning of target items, participants were required either to
imagine themselves in relation to the presented word (i.e. self-referenced encoding), or to
read the target words (i.e. read-only encoding). The self-referenced and read-only encoding
conditions were employed for different blocks of words. Specific encoding instructions were
provided to the participants immediately before the relevant block of items. Both read-only
and self-referenced encoding tasks were performed silently by the participants. Word sets, as
well as the order of the encoding conditions at study, were fully counterbalanced across
participants. No mention was made to the participants that they were taking part in a
memory test.
During the delay interval, participants were given a calibration test in order to find an
exposure speed at which word identification was impaired. This task was carried out as in
Experiment 2a and lasted between 5 and 10 min. None of the target experimental words was
used in this task. Finally during the test phase of the word identification task, all 192 words
were shown one by one at the critical exposure duration previously determined, with a
different random order for each participant. The task was to read out each word as it was
presented.
Results and Discussion
The temporal proximity of the end of year did indeed induce higher levels of state anxiety.
State anxiety scores increased from an average of 23.3 to 27.4 in low trait anxiety
participants, and from 43.4 to 45 in high anxiety participants. A 2 (high vs. low trait anxiety)
by 2 (first and second state anxiety measurement) mixed ANOVA on these data showed that
state anxiety was significantly elevated, F(1, 30) = 5.90, MSE = 21.44, p < .03. The lack of a
significant interaction between the two factors, F(1, 30) < 1.17, suggests that the increment
in state anxiety was comparable in both high and low trait anxiety groups.
Table 4 reports the mean number of words identified, as well as the priming scores (i.e. the
difference between primed and non-primed words) for each experimental condition.
Preliminary analyses indicated that there was no significant main effect of either word set or
order of encoding conditions on the number of words identified, and that these variables did
not interact significantly with priming. Word set, however, did interact significantly with
word type (i.e. threat-related vs. neutral), F (1,24) = 5.09, p < .05, suggesting that more
threat-related words were identified compared to neutral words for set 2, while there were no
differences between the number of identified threat-related and neutral words for set 1. The
important point is that word set neither interacted with priming nor with the anxiety factor.
A 2 (word type; threatening vs. neutral) by 2 (encoding conditions; self-referenced vs. read
only) by 2 (trait anxiety; high vs. low) mixed ANOVA on the number of baseline identified
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words showed significant main effects of word type, F(1, 30) = 6.92, MSE = 1.09, p < .02,
suggesting that more threat-related unprimed words were identified. There was a significant
main effect of encoding conditions, F(1, 30) = 5.23, MSE = 3.59, p < .03, suggesting that
more unprimed words were identified in the self-referenced condition. It is, however,
relevant to point out that the effect of encoding conditions might reflect differences in the
target material since there was no counterbalancing of study material with learning
conditions. Neither the main effect of anxiety nor any of the interactions were significant,
Fs(1, 30) < 2.15.
A 2 (word type; threatening vs. neutral) by 2 (priming; primed words vs. unprimed words)
by 2 (encoding conditions; self-referenced vs. read only) by 2 (trait anxiety; high vs. low)
mixed ANOVA on the number of identified words showed a significant main effect of
priming, F(1, 30) = 54.62, MSE = 6.01, p < .01, indicating that primed targets were
identified more often than non-primed baseline words. There was also a significant main
effect of word type, F(1, 30) = 7.72, MSE = 2.07, p < .01, suggesting that more threat-
related words (i.e. both primed and unprimed) were identified, and of encoding condition,
F(1, 30) = 13.12, MSE = 5.03, p < .01, suggesting that more words (i.e. both primed and
unprimed) were identified in the self-referenced condition, but see the above caveat. Neither
the main effect of anxiety nor any of the interactions were significant, Fs(1, 30) < 3.34. The
magnitudes of the F ratios for the critical three-way interaction involving trait anxiety,
priming, and word type, and the critical four-way interaction involving trait anxiety,
priming, word type, and encoding conditions were less than 1.43. It therefore appears that
implicit memory effects for threat-related versus neutral words was neither affected by trait
anxiety, nor by an interaction between trait anxiety and encoding conditions. The difference
between threat-related and neutral words priming scores was on average 0.68 items for high
anxious participants (95% CI ranged from −1.28 to 2.65 items), while this difference was −
0.56 items for low trait anxiety participants (95% CI ranged from −1.63 to 0.50 items). It
therefore appears that the priming effect for threat-related versus neutral words was not
affected by trait anxiety even when state anxiety was increased by a naturalistic stressor.
It is important to note that the display time at study in Experiment 2a was 5 s, while in
Experiment 2b this was 1 s only. However, the difference in study time between the two
experiments should not have affected the possibility of detecting an implicit memory bias. In
fact, empirical evidence seems to suggest that study time generally does not affect the
overall magnitude of priming (e.g. Neill, Beck, Bottalico, & Molloy, 1990). Moreover, the
size of the priming effect was not smaller in Experiment 2b compared to Experiment 2a
where a longer exposure of target words at study was employed.
A further analysis was carried out to bolster the conclusion that there was no mood
congruent memory bias for threat-related information in high trait anxiety participants. We
examined the statistical power that Experiments 2a and 2b combined had to detect an
expected medium effect size of d = 0.5 in the difference between priming scores for threat-
related items compared to neutral items in high trait anxiety participants. The total number
of high trait anxiety participants in Experiments 2a and 2b was 43. On average, the
difference in the priming scores between threat-related and neutral words in this sample was
−1.6% (95% CI ranged from −6.3% to 3%; percentages are used because the total number of
target items differed in Experiments 2a and 2b). Assuming that the manipulation of threat-
related versus neutral words on the magnitude of priming scores had an expected medium
effect size (i.e. d = 0.5), with 43 participants we had a power of .94 (one-tail) to reject the
false null hypothesis of no difference between priming scores for threat-related versus
neutral words among high trait anxiety individuals. Therefore, the empirical evidence appear
to support the view that trait anxiety does not induce a mood congruent memory bias for
threat-related information in implicit memory tasks. Finally, we would like to point out that
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the administration of the State Anxiety Inventory at the beginning of the experimental
session in Experiments 2a and 2b is unlikely to have induced a response bias in anxious
individuals given that there was no significant difference in the baseline performance
between high and low anxious participants.
General Discussion
Using word fragment completion and word identification, it is clear that none of our
experiments passed any of the criteria indicative of an implicit memory bias for threat-
related information in high trait anxiety participants. This lack of implicit memory bias
occurred in two experiments under conditions of elevated state anxiety (Experiments 2a and
2b), which, according to Williams et al. should facilitate the detection of such bias in
anxious individuals. Power analysis showed that the power to detect a significant difference
in priming effects between threat-related and neutral stimuli among anxious individuals was
84% and 94% for the word completion and the word identification tasks, respectively.
Therefore, the results obtained in Experiments 1, 2a and 2b complements those previously
described in the literature review on implicit memory bias in anxiety and suggest that there
is, in fact, no mood congruent bias in implicit memory tasks for high trait anxious
nonclinical individuals. A similar conclusion is also reached if we expand the literature
review to include published studies employing panic disorder patients or social phobic
individuals (Amir et al, 1996; Cloitre, Shear, Cancienne & Zeitlin, 1994; Otto et al., 1994;
Lundh & Ost, 1997; Lundh, Czyzykow & Ost, 1997; Rapee, McCallum, Melville,
Ravenscroft & Rodney, 1997). Only the Amir et al. study would pass the three previously
defined criteria, but only in one of three exposure conditions used in an implicit memory
task based on the assessment of the loudness of the noise in which target items were
embedded. While the Cloitre et al (1994) study would pass criteria a and b, the remaining
studies did not pass any of the three criteria for implicit memory bias in anxiety. Therefore,
the large majority of published experimental evidence indicates that anxious individuals do
not show a mood congruent bias in implicit memory tasks.
As is evident from the above reasoning and evidence, our conclusions on the status of mood
congruent implicit memory bias for threat-related information in anxiety are based on the
acceptance of the null hypothesis. It is important to point out that we accepted the null
hypothesis only after an extensive effort to try to disprove it. As suggested by Frick (1995),
this good effort criterion, even if subjective, is a plausible approach on which to base the
acceptance of the null hypothesis. Our conclusion was reached only after extensive testing.
In our three experiments, we used two different implicit memory tasks to assess the
generalizability of the obtained findings (in this case of the absence of a mood congruent
implicit memory bias). It is important to note that each experiment showed a strong overall
implicit memory effect, suggesting that the absence of a mood congruent effect cannot
simply be ascribed to the use of tasks insensitive to experimental manipulations. We also
showed that similar results are present in the published literature examining the effect of
anxiety on implicit memory tasks. In sum, it appears that there is a viable ground on which
to accept the null hypothesis concerning the absence of a mood congruent implicit memory
bias in anxiety.
Williams et al. (1997) have suggested a reason why anxious individuals may not show a
threat-related bias in implicit tasks. They argue that while threat-related target words may be
more fluent and thus more likely to be perceived by anxious individuals, these people may
then have an aversion to output threat words. As a consequence, high anxious people, may
fail to show an underlying mood congruent bias because it is masked by a response bias. We
think, however, that this hypothesis can be discounted on empirical grounds. To illustrate, if
anxious individuals tend to avoid the production of threat-related information, they would be
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expected to produce significantly less threat-related items than low anxious people in the
baseline condition (i.e. those items or fragments presented only at test). However, inspecting
the results obtained in Experiments 1, 2a and 2b, anxious individuals did not produce less
threat-related items in the baseline condition compared to low anxious individuals.
Therefore, a response bias hypothesis cannot explain the absence of a mood congruent
implicit memory bias for threat-related information in anxious individuals in the present
study.
The lack of memory bias for threat-related information is clearly at variance with the
predictions made by the Williams et al. model about the effect of emotions on information
processing. Assuming that trait anxiety is instrumental in favoring a better perceptual
integration of threat-related targets, it is evident that such a process does not induce a
priming bias for this type of information. However, the absence of a bias in implicit memory
is not unexpected on the basis of experimental findings in mainstream studies on implicit
memory. If, as suggested by the Williams et al. model, the integration of threat-related
information in anxious individuals is functionally equivalent to multiple exposures to the
same item, then, by the same logic, any item which receives multiple presentations during
learning should be better integrated and therefore should be primed more strongly than any
item receiving less presentations. However, it has been shown that massed presentations up
to 16 times of neutral targets at study does not in fact increase priming effects in a word
fragment completion task compared to targets presented only once at study (Challis &
Sidhu, 1993). Increased integration should also operate under extended presentation of
targets or under conditions in which target items are experienced at study under focused
attention. However, the fact is that neither of these variables has a major effect on priming in
implicit memory tasks. For example, Neill et al. (1990) found that increasing the
presentation time at study from 1 s up to 6.5 s did not affect the magnitude of priming
effects in a word fragment completion task. Similarly, Parkin, Reid and Russo (1990;
Mulligan & Hartman, 1996) showed that divided attention at study did not affect the overall
magnitude of priming effects in word fragment completion.
Thus, there is a large body of evidence indicating that minimal exposure to target items is
enough to achieve an optimal level of structural/perceptual integration of target items to
support normal priming effects in implicit memory. Thus, while there may well be enhanced
perceptual integration of threatening items for high anxious individuals, this enhanced
integration is unlikely to be reflected in increased priming effects in implicit memory tasks.
Consistent with this view is the lack of an enhanced priming effect for threat-related
information in high anxious individuals in almost all of the published studies. Overall,
however, we believe that the current findings do not necessarily call for a revision of the
Williams et al. model. We think that the predictions made from this model about the
presence of an implicit memory bias for threat-related information in anxious individuals
reflect an overvaluation of the influence that the possible extra integration of threat-related
stimuli can have on performance in implicit memory tasks.
In conclusion, we think that the interest in the study of implicit memory bias in anxiety can
be traced to the general interest in the study of implicit memory over the last fifteen years.
We also think that this interest was fueled by the Williams et al model's incorrect prediction
about the presence of an implicit memory bias for threat-related information in anxious
individuals. Threat-related information may well be more extensively integrated in anxious
individuals. However, implicit memory tasks are not suitable to detect such integration. In
order to address the issue of the perceptual integration of threat-related information in
anxiety it is probably more fruitful to analyze the outcome of empirical studies on the status
of attentional bias in anxiety.
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